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1password cli as auth source for autofs
Hi, I have a setup where autofs is mounting CIFS network shares, and I'd like to avoid having the password in plaintext. For that purpose, I set up a named pipe, with a systemd process auto populating it with username, and password taken from `op`. This works, but given that `autofs` auto unmounts when the directory is not used – so I get reprompted a lot to authorize. Is there a way to avoid this, or a better way to set this up?
1Password CLI Biometric Authentication in Dev Container
I like to develop using https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/devcontainers/containers on my MacBook, and I love to be able to load secrets dynamically with the 1Password CLI. Using the 1Password CLI works great when I run commands directly on my mac. However when I setup a DevContainer to develop inside of, the 1Password CLI is not connecting. 1Password SSH biometric authentication still works, but I assume that is because the DevContainer is able to connect to the ssh socket. Can I mount the 1Password CLI socket into the DevContainer so that when I run "op" commands it is able to connect to my host machines 1Password Desktop App? Where is the 1Password CLI socket so that I might mount it? I should also note that the DevContainer Distributor ID: Debian Description: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm) Release: 12 Codename: bookworm 1Password Version: 1Password for Mac 8.10.36 (81036049) Extension Version: CLI Version 2.29.0 OS Version: macOS 14.5 Browser: Not Provided
FR: Allow Environments to reference Vault Items
Description: Currently, 1Password Environments and Vault Items are two completely separate systems with no connection between them. This creates a fundamental problem for professional workflows: Environments provide fast, secure secret delivery via Named Pipes – great for local development Vault Items provide rotation, audit trails, access control, and CLI management – great for operations But you have to choose one or maintain both in parallel, which means either giving up rotation or giving up fast secret delivery. Proposed Solution: Allow an Environment variable to be linked to a Vault Item. The Environment would act as a structured view over Vault Items, not a separate data store. Benefits: Single source of truth – secrets live in Vault Items, Environments just expose them Rotation works automatically – rotate the Vault Item, the Environment reflects the change immediately Audit trail remains intact – all access and changes tracked in Vault Items Named Pipe delivery stays fast – no change to the developer experience
1Password 'Environments' and monorepos/collocated deployment configuration
I'm fiddling with Environments today to see how it would work for my workflows, and immediately ran into two fairly significant blockers: ## Multi-environment orchestration The only way I can see to get an environment-ID into an `op run` command is as a flag/env-var pre-dispatch; but for something like Ansible, where an entire inventory of tasks require a complex mapping of projects/apps/secrets/teams, that would require centralizing all of the "environment IDs" into one top-level invocation, irrespective of what actual tasks the given Ansible command might run. (This isn't Ansible-specific, "ansible" here could be any complicated orchestration tool that makes intelligent decisions about what to do for multiple potential environments.) Yes, I'm sure the blessed path, or what would be ideal for 1P, is that each possible orchestration tool in existence use the 1P SDK, have a built-in, or a plugin, or something like that, so that 1P is separately queried for each target/environment - but there will always be *some* tool that doesn't (up to an ad-nauseum target of "all of our deployment is bespoke by scripting.") At the moment, this situation is still better served by the previously-extant `op://` references in static env-files: they're "discoverable" during the process, in that anything/everything present in the environment is substituted at launch-time; but that's also worse in its own way - they're less isolated, and it leaves a similar "collect all the environment for all possible targets first, before executing the orchestrator." I don't necessarily have a specific feature-request or a way I imagine this working, right now; I just wanted to surface the annoyance for you to consider as you're working on the feature. (Related issue, similar vein, but not exactly the same architectural problem - there's only one `OP_ENVIRONMENT_ID` env-var; and while the `op run` can take multiple environment-flags, that's again a single-point-of-invocation issue. Ways to construct partial environment-based assignments pre-invocation is missing here, unless you store them manually and construct some method of passing them to `op run` - i.e. there's no equivalent of `op://` references, where multiple different scripts and wrappers can all happily contribute multiple `op://` references into the environment without coordinating, and one final `op run` can consume/resolve all of them for some sort of commit/apply process.) ## Duplication of secrets This one is the much bigger one, and kinda a dealbreaker, at least for me. For basically any given secret, I *already* have a central, authoritative 1Password entry as the source-of-truth for that - it has version-history, shared notes, access permissions for people, it autofills browsers and logins and CLI invocations ... but at the moment, "1Password Environments" only allows me to put in 'dumb strings' as variable-values. Which means that I need to, say, *duplicate* a database-user password in both 1. a 1Password vault-entry, and 2. a 1Password environment-variable. (... and then document somewhere that it's been duplicated; and establish process to make sure anybody modifying it knows to go modify both; and, and, and ...) I assumed when starting this out that the entire point of 1Password environments would be, effectively, something like a templating system: include, inline in the definitions, the equivalent of `op://` references to other *existing* secrets, such that they're filled in when actualized onto the filesystem or requested from SDK apps. (Think, "username" and "password" are already in a database vault-entry; so the `DATABASE_URL` env-var configures how to construct the database-url from those keys.) Without that functionality, I'm actually a little lost as to the value/purpose of environments (not to criticize anyone's hard work, or anything; I'm sure there's a pictured use-case that makes sense, I'm just not currently managing to see it, haha.) So, the request here is a little more direct: let me configure references to other 1Password items in environment-variables - at a minimum as a 1:1 correlation (i.e. `DB_USER` being configured directly to `op://Team Secrets/Database - Prod/Postgres/username`); but ideally, with some minimal templating, so additional content/simple structure can be hardcoded into the env-vars that are *mostly* derived from secrets (Postgres connection-strings/URLs; or derivation from other env-vars to avoid duplication on that end either, such as configuring `USER_PW` to `op://Team Secrets/${HOSTNAME}/password`.) Hope this is helpful feeback about the issues somebody ran into in the real-world trying to apply this! I *do* love the promise of ditching env-files-full-of-`op://`-references-hardcoded-into-repos, in favour of something more auditable / sited-with-the-secrets-in-question / dynamically-configurable.op read can't access labeled website URLs, only the primary one
I have a Login item with multiple website URLs, each with a different label. For example, a self-hosted service with: - website (primary) — the public URL through a reverse proxy - local network — the LAN address with a valid cert Reading the primary one works: $ op read "op://Private/My Server/website" https://myserver.example.com/ But there's no way to get the labeled one: $ op read "op://Private/My Server/local network" [ERROR] could not read secret: item does not have a field 'local network' The URLs show up in op item get --format json under the urls array, but they aren't fields, so op:// references don't work. I inject secrets into scripts via .env files and op:// references. Works for everything except labeled URLs. Right now, I have to fall back to: op item get "My Server" --format json | jq '.urls[] | select(.label=="local network") | .href' which doesn't fit the op:// pattern and can't be used in .env files. It'd be useful if labeled URLs were referenceable, something like op://Vault/Item/urls/local network or whatever syntax makes sense. op v2.30.3, macOS.
SSH Agent refuses a key
Could it be related to the most recent outage? It was working yesterday, but doesn't work today. I haven't changed anything. debug2: pubkey_prepare: done debug1: Offering public key: SSH Key ED25519 SHA256:VtP3fFMD4SAYpQEoQdqieskmDJAJHsT/grXH3EcWOnU agent debug3: send packet: type 50 debug2: we sent a publickey packet, wait for reply debug3: receive packet: type 60 debug1: Server accepts key: SSH Key ED25519 SHA256:VtP3fFMD4SAYpQEoQdqieskmDJAJHsT/grXH3EcWOnU agent debug3: sign_and_send_pubkey: using publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com with ED25519 SHA256:VtP3fFMD4SAYpQEoQdqieskmDJAJHsT/grXH3EcWOnU debug3: sign_and_send_pubkey: signing using ssh-ed25519 SHA256:VtP3fFMD4SAYpQEoQdqieskmDJAJHsT/grXH3EcWOnU sign_and_send_pubkey: signing failed for ED25519 "SSH Key" from agent: agent refused operationFeature Request: Manage "Autofill Behavior" via CLI/API
Hi team, I’m requesting the ability to programmatically set Autofill Behavior (e.g., "Always fill on this domain," "Only on this exact domain," or "Never fill") using the 1Password CLI and API. Current Pain Point: While I can create and edit items via op item create/edit, there is currently no flag or field to define how the browser extension should handle autofill for that specific URL. This requires manual GUI intervention after an automated setup. Proposed Feature: Add a flag or JSON attribute to the CLI to toggle these settings. Example: op item edit "My App" --url "https://sub.dev.com" --autofill "exact-domain" Use Case: Security: Automatically enforcing "Exact Domain Only" for sensitive subdomains during vault provisioning. Automation: Fully configuring new items for team members without requiring them to manually adjust settings in the browser.op.exe considered harmful?
I’d like to raise a point about the current security model of op.exe, and how it affects protection against supply-chain or similar attacks. Consider a scenario where an attacker manages to execute malicious code locally, for example, via a compromised Python package. While this is often considered “game over,” in practice we still want to avoid being the easiest target in such situations. A common behavior of malicious payloads is to harvest local secrets. While 1Password provides some protection against direct file access, an attacker can simply invoke op.exe, which actually centralizes access to clear-text secrets in a very convenient way. Although op.exe prompts the user for permission, my understanding is that this permission applies broadly (e.g., to the entire account for a period such as 10 minutes). As a user, I can see which application is requesting access, but not which vaults or items are being queried. In practice, the application name (e.g., WindowsTerminal) is not very helpful in determining whether the request is legitimate. I’d be interested in others’ perspectives on this. Some potential improvements that seem valuable to me: When requesting permission, op.exe should provide more context (e.g., which vaults and items are being accessed). Users should be able to grant permissions at a finer granularity: not just account-wide, but limited to specific vaults or even individual items. Another useful feature would be the ability to mark certain items or vaults as excluded from programmatic access (via op.exe, and possibly browser extensions). Even better, this could be the default behavior, requiring explicit opt-in at the item level. I understand that such restrictions would be enforced client-side and therefore not fully robust. However, they would still meaningfully increase the effort required for a malicious local process to enumerate and exfiltrate secrets, and thus provide practical security benefits. Finally, it might be worth considering stronger protections at the vault level—for example, requiring explicit user authentication (master password, or even a separate password) before allowing access to secrets. This could apply not only to op.exe, but also to the interactive 1Password client.I would like EPM with my SOC workflow for Oauth. Looking forward to SCIM improvements for SecOps.
Didn't understand half of what the blog post went over b/c i had to remember so many acronymns. https://1password.com/blog/automating-soc-workflows-with-1password-enterprise-password-manager Look at what is happening in society. People are live streaming implementations of openclaw and exposing their tokens. OPENCLAW DEMO THAT YOU NEED TO WATCH. I TIMESTAMPED IT SO U GO TO GOOD PARTop CLI hangs on macOS Tahoe
macOS: 26.3.1 (a) (25D771280a) op version: 2.33.1 A few days ago, I upgraded the CLI from Homebrew, and all my Terminal sessions started to hang randomly from time to time. So I can no longer use it in the scripts anymore. I tested across multiple Terminals (Warp, macOS Terminal, iTerm) to make sure it wasn't isolated to a given terminal. I tried to research online, and I found https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/issues/55459 which solved my problem, at least for now. I had to add that `export OP_CACHE=false`, so it seems that it wasn't related to my computer per se (to be clear, it is NOT about openclaw in my case) I can't find any thread in the forum, but ideally, `op` fixes the situation.
