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Browser Extension Risk Clickjacking
According to this report, I wondered what the position of 1Password is on this issue and when it will be fixed.
[Note that I'm marking this as a Solution just to make it more visible]
Hi all,Thanks for all the questions and the thoughtful discussion. We wanted to provide a bit more context about the research and what it means for 1Password users.
A researcher identified a variation of a clickjacking attack, where a malicious website can trick someone into unknowingly triggering the autofill action in a browser extension. They reported the issue through our bug bounty program and worked with us ahead of their DEF CON presentation.
Clickjacking is not unique to the 1Password browser extension. It is a long-standing web attack technique that affects websites and browser extensions broadly. The underlying issue lies in the way browsers render webpages. After conducting a thorough review, including prototyping potential mitigations, we concluded there’s no comprehensive technical fix that browser extensions can deliver on their own.
Your information in 1Password remains encrypted and protected. Clickjacking does not expose your 1Password data or export your vault contents, and no website can directly access your information without interaction with the browser extension’s autofill element. At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
We take this and all security concerns seriously, and our approach to this particular risk is to focus on giving customers more control. 1Password already requires confirmation before autofilling payment information, and in our next release, which is already shipped and undergoing review from the browser extension stores, we’re extending that protection so users can choose to enable confirmation alerts for other types of data. This helps users stay informed when autofill is happening and in control of their data.
On the question of disabling autofill: while it might feel safer, it can actually create more risk. Without autofill, people are more likely to reuse weak passwords or copy and paste credentials into websites, where they can still be stolen if the site is malicious. Autofill also protects you against phishing sites by only working on the exact domains your credentials are saved for. In practice, for the majority of users, we believe the risk of disabling autofill is greater than the risk of clickjacking.
Passkeys are not impacted by clickjacking. Passkeys are tied to the website they’re created on and generate a one-time signature during login. That means no reusable secret is ever exposed, and even if someone tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent to steal.
You can learn more in our security advisory.
43 Replies
While I think it is not so easy to exploit this, it's still possible (subdomain hijacking, XSS, ...)
I really want to see some efforts from a password manager to prevent this, other than making another prompt for filling in personal data. I'm aware of the security advisory (https://support.1password.com/kb/202508/) but I'm not convinced that this should "fix" the problem as a whole.Please implement additional mitigations to make it even harder for attackers as mentioned by Marek Tóth:
https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/#mitigationThanks
This is absolutely unacceptable, we have banned 1Password extension globally because 1Password refused to properly address the clickjacking issue, and now we are looking into switching to a new password management product that chose to fix this issue.
- 1P_Blake
Community Manager
This isn't something we've refused to fix — it's something no extension can completely fix on its own. There are partial mitigation approaches out there, but in our research and testing, they can break expected behavior without fully eliminating the risk.
That’s why we’ve focused on safeguards that matter in practice. The 1Password extension already enforces strict domain matching so logins only fill where they belong, and it blocks scripts from tampering with the extension interface. Credit cards have always required a confirmation prompt before filling, and in our latest release we’ve added the option to turn that same protection on for other item types too.
Our goal is to reduce the risk in a way that’s both effective and reliable in everyday use. If you’d like the deep dive, we’ve put together a security advisory and a blog post that walks through the research and the steps we’ve taken.
Hello!
I was recently made aware of a clickjacking exploit that many password manager browser extensions are vulnerable to, including 1Password. This was presented at this year's Defcon on August 9th, with responsible disclosure made known to 1Password back in April.
https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/#key-information
A good example of how this attack works is shown here, with the attack website overlaid with the browser extension elements at half-opacity. https://share.cleanshot.com/9S0XzK4W
The extension elements would be invisible in a real attack.
I'm an owner on my company's 1Password for Business plan, and wanted to know what administrative steps I can take with 1Password to secure against this attack, and if 1Password has any public response to this exploit.
There are several steps users can take to mitigate the attack both in the extension settings, and the way their browser handles the extension. However, I am not finding a way to administratively change extension settings for my users with 1Password, and would need them to take these steps manually. I can possibly use managed browser settings to only allow extensions site access on click.
The two steps I have taken are to force the auto lock time to 10 minutes, and to require app updates. However this exploit is present in recent versions (<=8.11.7.2).
https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/#fixed-versions
I will also be integrating with a SEIM tool. Is there anything else I could be doing to protect my company?- 1P_Blake
The steps you’ve already taken are spot on. Enforcing shorter auto-lock times and requiring app updates are exactly the kind of things that help reduce exposure today. On your broader question, we’ve published both a security advisory and a blog post that go deeper into the research and our response.
While users can already turn on confirmation prompts for all item types in their extension settings, we know that’s tough to manage across a whole company. That’s why we’re rolling out a new Business policy that will let admins set those defaults for their team. Timelines will be shared soon, but it’s actively in the works.
In my opinion, it is not acceptable for 1Password not to fix a known vulnerability because it can only steal the login credentials for sites one at a time. You are right that 1P asks me to verify entry of passwords if the website name differs from what was originally input. I usually just allow it without thinking. Won't do that anymore. I also will remove all browser extensions and look for another password manager.
- 1P_Blake
It's not that this is something we've chosen not to fix — but rather that clickjacking is something no extension can completely fix on its own. There are partial mitigation approaches out there, but in our research and testing, they can break expected behavior without fully eliminating the risk.
The 1Password extension already has safeguards in place to protect against real-world risks like this. Logins only fill on the domains they’re saved for, and the extension blocks scripts from tampering with its interface. Credit cards have always required a confirmation prompt before filling, and in our latest release we’ve extended that same protection to other item types as well.
I hear your point about sometimes approving prompts out of habit — that’s exactly why we’ve focused on visibility and control, so autofill only happens when you mean it to. Paired with shorter auto-lock times, it’s another layer that makes clickjacking much harder to exploit.
Hi,
the latest release of the 1Password Browser Extension is 8.11.7, yet, the Firefox Extension is still stuck at 8.11.4 - could you please have a look what's going on?
This especially means, Firefox users are currently missing out on the security feature in 8.11.7.2: https://support.1password.com/kb/202508/
1Password Releases:
Mozilla Add-ons page:
Thanks!
- 1P_Blake
Thanks for flagging this, and apologies for the delayed response. 😅
Firefox releases can sometimes appear later than other browsers due to Mozilla’s review process. The latest version has been approved since your comment and is live on the Firefox Add-ons site, so you should now be able to update to 8.11.8.40 which includes the fixes mentioned here.
Has 1Password addressed this? I'm a bit ticked that I had to find out about it from my newsfeed, and not a notification from 1Password:
https://www.tomsguide.com/computing/online-security/major-flaw-in-top-password-managers-lets-hackers-steal-your-login-details-2fa-codes-credit-card-info-and-moreThanks for the updates. I wonder why the other password managers implemented a fix, and not 1Password?
Until fixes become available, Tóth recommends that users disable the autofill function in their password managers and only use copy/paste.
BleepingComputer has contacted all vendors who haven’t pushed fixes onto their products yet, and we will update this post with their responses once they reach us.
[Update 8/20 3:20 PM EST] - LastPass and LogMeOnce reached out to BleepingComputer following the publication of this article to explain that they too are working on resolving the issues raised in Tóth's report.
[Update 8/20 3:40 PM EST] - Edited the vendor notification timeline for better accuracy, based on new information received from Socket.
[Update 8/20 4:15 PM EST] - LastPass sent BleepingComputer the following statement:
The vendors that implemented fixes are Dashlane (v6.2531.1 released on August 1), NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm, and Keeper (v17.2.0 released in July). However, users should make sure that they're running the latest available versions of the products.
ericmacknight
You will not find it in the 1Pasword iOS App. You have to open Safari Browser, open a website and open 1Password from the icon in front of the URL in the address bar. Then you have to switch to the settings of that 1Password extension. Under "Security" you'll find that new setting. The setting is enabled for credit cards by default.Ah, sorry, I wasn't clear. I was referring to 1Password on my Mac, not on my phone. I tried something as close to what you describe, on my laptop, but did not find anything.
Still confused, despite your kind attempt to unconfuse me ;^)
It's good to see the fast traction with response to the https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/.
I’m a long-time customer who trusts 1Password for my company, myself and my direct and extended family.
While I can dig deep in this forum and discover what settings I need to enable to stay safe, I can’t stand behind my team and extended family's shoulder to ensure they are protected and all the right settings are enabled.
In light of this discovery, I would not only appreciate product updates, but also see 1password push distinct information campaigns and clear guidance to help non-experts stay safe.1) Proactive In-App customer education (now)
Instead of just sending promotional emails from info@, get in front of user's eyes with best practices: In response of the spotlight on clickjacking vulnerability that has reached millions, be quick with an email + in-app banner/notification that links to a short, plain-language guide on what this is about and how to protect yourself.
Include the exact settings to reduce risk (with screenshots) for users concerned about this issue.
When release new settings, make sure they are released as DEFAULTS not something the customer needs to learn about:
I understand 1password is built around convenience but convenience is an IDEAL, security is a MUST.Best practices could highlight:
- New Settings: Recommend to keep payment confirmations on; enable confirmations for all item types when the update lands. I had to dig to find this in the first place, just to see that these settings came DISabled.
- Set critical Logins to fill on the exact site they were saved for.
- Use a short auto-lock time for the extension.
- Be comprehensive (consider all device types, OS / mobile apps)
- (...)
2) Product hardening (upcoming releases)
I don't agree with Jacob's statement that all this can just be rolled off to user behavior and the way browser extensions are architected. Clickjacking is deception technique that may be able to be detected with some level of accuracy.- Add occlusion/overlay detection and refuse to fill when the page is dimmed, overlaid, or visually altered (popover/top-layer present, opacity/filters on html/body, etc.).
- Move all sensitive fills (PII, TOTP, passkeys) to an out-of-page, trusted UI (same model used for payment confirmations), so page DOM tricks can’t hide prompts
- Change defaults to exact-host matching; broader scopes must be explicit. (again be conservative)
- Make prompts item-specific and contextual (“Fill Visa ••••4242 on checkout.example.com?”), never generic.
- Provide enterprise policies to family accounts: e.g. allow me to enforce exact-host matching, require confirmations for all fills, disable PII/credit-card autofill, shorten auto-lock, and support a first-class “on-click” injection mode.
- I'm sure your team has more ideas.
Even if there’s no single, comprehensive browser-level fix, layered defenses and safer defaults materially will reduce real-world risk—especially for non-technical users who rely on 1Passwords security.I have been and want to keep recommending 1Password to other companies and family members. It may be a mission shift but I would hope 1password sees it's responsibility to not only ship a secure product - but to provide the most secure experience end-to-end, closing gaps from product to the user - with the appropriate education at the appropriate time.
If users would get this served to them by default, in bite-size in-app messages (without having to dig up their own research), It would make me sleep a lot better.
Thanks for engaging here and for the work already underway...- 1P_Blake
Thanks for taking the time to write such a detailed comment bhx! It’s clear you’ve really thought about both the technical side of this and the practical impact for people who may not be security experts. We share that focus, and your points around defaults, education, and layered defenses are very much in line with the kinds of conversations our teams are having internally.
On the product-hardening side, the research being discussed reviewed a wide range of technical implementations, many of which don’t apply to the 1Password browser extension. Our extension is already built with multiple layers of protection. It prevents other scripts from manipulating the extension interface and enforces strict origin-matching rules that stop unintended iframe autofill and common web-based attacks like many types of XSS.
Because the attack scenario assumes a fully malicious website with complete control over its own scripting and UI, there are limits to what additional preventative measures can achieve. For example, current browser behavior allows Popover APIs to be layered on top of each other, reducing the effectiveness of some proposed alternatives.
To address this risk, we’ve taken a product- and user-focused approach: a confirmation alert makes it clear when autofill occurs. This prompt is especially important for credit card and identity items, which can be autofilled on any webpage or domain. It’s important to note that login items already benefit from extensive safeguards, as they only autofill on domains that match the site saved in 1Password.
We remain committed to strengthening the extension, while also ensuring our protections are practical, reliable, and user-friendly. If you'd like to dig in further, we’ve published both a security advisory and a blog with additional details.
Thank you, 1P_SimonH , for the explanation.
But, as shown in the next video, there is no data, I actively fill in on a website. I just solve a puzzle and in the background all my items in my 1Password vault are shared with the hacker.
https://marektoth.com/video/dom-extension-clickjacking-demo2.mp4
The video shows what could happen, and this should be fixed immediately.
Don't get me wrong, it's also good to have the possibility to enable a confirmation, before autofill.
- 1P_SimonH
Hi DenalB ,
We’ve released a new security advisory that might help explain what data is at risk and what isn’t.
Clickjacking does not expose all your 1Password data or export all your vault contents, and no website can directly access your information without interaction with the browser extension’s autofill element. At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
We chose the confirmation approach because we identified that many technical controls to detect and prevent clickjacking attacks come with limitations and can often be bypassed or break expected behavior for legitimate sites, as they don’t address the broader class of attack.
I hope this helps. Please let us know if you have additional questions! The video you linked is an example of an older iFrame-based vulnerability and, more importantly, does not apply to 1Password. You can see the same video you referenced in the researcher's paper at:
https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/#iframe-based
There, the researcher says:
In this research focused on password managers, one of them had this issue.
In December 2023, I reported this clickjacking vulnerability in the NordPass password manager.
Above that quote, the researcher also stated that he was explaining the iFrame-based vulnerability only as background. It was not the subject of the current research:
I will first describe the IFRAME-based variant, which was not the research focus but may be unknown to many people.
Concerning how 1Password is vulnerable to clickjacking, 1P_SimonH said:
At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
The researcher's conclusion agrees with that:
1 click = attacker gets your credentials incl. TOTP (only for vulnerable domain)
Thanks for mentioning that! It wasn't clear to me. Now it is. Thanks. 🙏
- 1P_SimonH
[Note that I'm marking this as a Solution just to make it more visible]
Hi all,Thanks for all the questions and the thoughtful discussion. We wanted to provide a bit more context about the research and what it means for 1Password users.
A researcher identified a variation of a clickjacking attack, where a malicious website can trick someone into unknowingly triggering the autofill action in a browser extension. They reported the issue through our bug bounty program and worked with us ahead of their DEF CON presentation.
Clickjacking is not unique to the 1Password browser extension. It is a long-standing web attack technique that affects websites and browser extensions broadly. The underlying issue lies in the way browsers render webpages. After conducting a thorough review, including prototyping potential mitigations, we concluded there’s no comprehensive technical fix that browser extensions can deliver on their own.
Your information in 1Password remains encrypted and protected. Clickjacking does not expose your 1Password data or export your vault contents, and no website can directly access your information without interaction with the browser extension’s autofill element. At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
We take this and all security concerns seriously, and our approach to this particular risk is to focus on giving customers more control. 1Password already requires confirmation before autofilling payment information, and in our next release, which is already shipped and undergoing review from the browser extension stores, we’re extending that protection so users can choose to enable confirmation alerts for other types of data. This helps users stay informed when autofill is happening and in control of their data.
On the question of disabling autofill: while it might feel safer, it can actually create more risk. Without autofill, people are more likely to reuse weak passwords or copy and paste credentials into websites, where they can still be stolen if the site is malicious. Autofill also protects you against phishing sites by only working on the exact domains your credentials are saved for. In practice, for the majority of users, we believe the risk of disabling autofill is greater than the risk of clickjacking.
Passkeys are not impacted by clickjacking. Passkeys are tied to the website they’re created on and generate a one-time signature during login. That means no reusable secret is ever exposed, and even if someone tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent to steal.
You can learn more in our security advisory.
So, Autofill = good, Invisible Auto-submit = bad. "Out of band" confirmation sounds like a good (comprehensive, technical) solution.
For family and employees who don't care what happens under the covers (or overlays) - i.e. 95% of humanity - but want bullet-roof security:
- Enable "Ask before filling" for all three item types in Security,
- Disable "Sign in automatically after autofill" in Autofill & Save (handles other use cases)
There are reports that clickjacking also steals passkeys at 1password:
https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/dom-based-extension-clickjacking.html- 1P_SimonH
Hi preetgill,
Passkeys are not impacted. All passkeys are bound to the specific website that they were registered on, with few exceptions that must be configured by a website’s owner ahead of time. This inherently only allows a passkey to be requested at all on specific sites. Additionally, passkeys generate a one-time signature (with a random, server-controlled value) during login, so no reusable secret is ever exposed. Even if a bad actor tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent for them to steal and a website’s server would reject the use of old signatures
I just installed the new version of the 1Password for Safari extension, which says that "ask before filling" is an option under Settings / Security, but I cannot find that option anywhere.
- 1P_Blake
ericmacknight
Please double-check to make sure you're actually running 1Password for Safari 8.11.7.2, and not an older version. You can verify this by checking the "About" tab in the extension settings.1Password for Safari 8.11.7.2 will have additional autofill settings in Settings > Security as shown below.
