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Browser Extension Risk Clickjacking
According to this report, I wondered what the position of 1Password is on this issue and when it will be fixed.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/major-password-managers-can-leak-login...
[Note that I'm marking this as a Solution just to make it more visible]
Hi all,Thanks for all the questions and the thoughtful discussion. We wanted to provide a bit more context about the research and what it means for 1Password users.
A researcher identified a variation of a clickjacking attack, where a malicious website can trick someone into unknowingly triggering the autofill action in a browser extension. They reported the issue through our bug bounty program and worked with us ahead of their DEF CON presentation.
Clickjacking is not unique to the 1Password browser extension. It is a long-standing web attack technique that affects websites and browser extensions broadly. The underlying issue lies in the way browsers render webpages. After conducting a thorough review, including prototyping potential mitigations, we concluded there’s no comprehensive technical fix that browser extensions can deliver on their own.
Your information in 1Password remains encrypted and protected. Clickjacking does not expose your 1Password data or export your vault contents, and no website can directly access your information without interaction with the browser extension’s autofill element. At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
We take this and all security concerns seriously, and our approach to this particular risk is to focus on giving customers more control. 1Password already requires confirmation before autofilling payment information, and in our next release, which is already shipped and undergoing review from the browser extension stores, we’re extending that protection so users can choose to enable confirmation alerts for other types of data. This helps users stay informed when autofill is happening and in control of their data.
On the question of disabling autofill: while it might feel safer, it can actually create more risk. Without autofill, people are more likely to reuse weak passwords or copy and paste credentials into websites, where they can still be stolen if the site is malicious. Autofill also protects you against phishing sites by only working on the exact domains your credentials are saved for. In practice, for the majority of users, we believe the risk of disabling autofill is greater than the risk of clickjacking.
Passkeys are not impacted by clickjacking. Passkeys are tied to the website they’re created on and generate a one-time signature during login. That means no reusable secret is ever exposed, and even if someone tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent to steal.
You can learn more in our security advisory.
1P_SimonH
Community Manager
Community Manager[Note that I'm marking this as a Solution just to make it more visible]
Hi all,
Thanks for all the questions and the thoughtful discussion. We wanted to provide a bit more context about the research and what it means for 1Password users.
A researcher identified a variation of a clickjacking attack, where a malicious website can trick someone into unknowingly triggering the autofill action in a browser extension. They reported the issue through our bug bounty program and worked with us ahead of their DEF CON presentation.
Clickjacking is not unique to the 1Password browser extension. It is a long-standing web attack technique that affects websites and browser extensions broadly. The underlying issue lies in the way browsers render webpages. After conducting a thorough review, including prototyping potential mitigations, we concluded there’s no comprehensive technical fix that browser extensions can deliver on their own.
Your information in 1Password remains encrypted and protected. Clickjacking does not expose your 1Password data or export your vault contents, and no website can directly access your information without interaction with the browser extension’s autofill element. At most, a malicious or compromised webpage could trick you into autofilling one matching item per click, not everything in your account.
We take this and all security concerns seriously, and our approach to this particular risk is to focus on giving customers more control. 1Password already requires confirmation before autofilling payment information, and in our next release, which is already shipped and undergoing review from the browser extension stores, we’re extending that protection so users can choose to enable confirmation alerts for other types of data. This helps users stay informed when autofill is happening and in control of their data.
On the question of disabling autofill: while it might feel safer, it can actually create more risk. Without autofill, people are more likely to reuse weak passwords or copy and paste credentials into websites, where they can still be stolen if the site is malicious. Autofill also protects you against phishing sites by only working on the exact domains your credentials are saved for. In practice, for the majority of users, we believe the risk of disabling autofill is greater than the risk of clickjacking.
Passkeys are not impacted by clickjacking. Passkeys are tied to the website they’re created on and generate a one-time signature during login. That means no reusable secret is ever exposed, and even if someone tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent to steal.
You can learn more in our security advisory.
So, Autofill = good, Invisible Auto-submit = bad. "Out of band" confirmation sounds like a good (comprehensive, technical) solution.
For family and employees who don't care what happens under the covers (or overlays) - i.e. 95% of humanity - but want bullet-roof security:
- Enable "Ask before filling" for all three item types in Security,
- Disable "Sign in automatically after autofill" in Autofill & Save (handles other use cases)
There are reports that clickjacking also steals passkeys at 1password:
https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/dom-based-extension-clickjacking.html- 1P_SimonH
Hi preetgill,
Passkeys are not impacted. All passkeys are bound to the specific website that they were registered on, with few exceptions that must be configured by a website’s owner ahead of time. This inherently only allows a passkey to be requested at all on specific sites. Additionally, passkeys generate a one-time signature (with a random, server-controlled value) during login, so no reusable secret is ever exposed. Even if a bad actor tried clickjacking, there’s nothing permanent for them to steal and a website’s server would reject the use of old signatures
I just installed the new version of the 1Password for Safari extension, which says that "ask before filling" is an option under Settings / Security, but I cannot find that option anywhere.
- 1P_Blake
ericmacknight
Please double-check to make sure you're actually running 1Password for Safari 8.11.7.2, and not an older version. You can verify this by checking the "About" tab in the extension settings.1Password for Safari 8.11.7.2 will have additional autofill settings in Settings > Security as shown below.
Any estimated time about Firefox update?
Is there an ETA for the Plugin-Update for Firefox? Still at 8.11.4.27 here. :-(
Please advise versions of extensions for safari, edge and chrome that have been patched
Am I correct in the assessment that if you supported the Mac autofill extension system I could avoid risk? Do you have any plans to do this.
[...] in our next release, which is already shipped and undergoing review from the browser extension stores, we’re extending that protection so users can choose to enable confirmation alerts for other types of data. This helps users stay informed when autofill is happening and in control of their data. [...]
Thank you, Simon!
This is exactly what we need to resolve these issues. In my opinion, it is important to enable these confirmation alerts for credit cards (already active) and PII, because they apply to all sites, so they can be stolen also when I visit a compromised site on which I don't have any saved account. Credentials are tied to a specific website or domain, so the risk is much lower.
[UPDATE]
The new version has just arrived on both Chrome and Edge stores. Thank you again for the quick resolution.
Thank you. What I am wondering, however, is that it seems there may be a possibility to fix the reported issues. NordPass, Proton Pass, RoboForm, Keeper, and Dashlane have reportedly already addressed them, and according to Socket, Bitwarden, Enpass, and iCloud Passwords are all actively working on fixes. Could you elaborate on why 1Password cannot fix the demonstrated issues?
https://socket.dev/blog/password-manager-clickjacking- 1P_SimonH
Hi accordionmelody,
We conducted a thorough review, including prototyping potential mitigations and investigating the solutions other password managers put in place. Through this review, we identified that many technical controls to detect and prevent clickjacking attacks come with limitations and can often be bypassed or break expected behavior for legitimate sites, as they don’t address the broader class of attack.
Our approach is to address this risk through confirmation prompts for sensitive data, autofill restricted to the exact sites to which your data belongs, and greater user control. These safeguards are already in place for credit card information, login/TOTP, and passkeys, and are extended to personally identifiable items in the next release (8.11.7.2 or 8.11.7 for Safari). That means users and businesses will have the option of turning on confirmation popups for sensitive data autofill. This approach reduces the likelihood of harm resulting from this particular class of attack and ensures they are clearly informed when autofill is happening, remaining in control of their user information.
